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1. Introduction
This note provides an introduction to the impact 
evaluation of labor market programs, with particular 
reference to developing countries. Its focus is on the 
main issues that need to be considered when planning 
an impact evaluation, including the importance of rig-
orous design for an evaluation, and on the statistical 
techniques used to estimate program impacts. To help 
the exposition, a prototype of a training program is 
referred to intermittently throughout the note. This 
hypothetical training program, which we call Get-to-
Work, provides training to the unemployed to help them 
find work.
The note describes some general issues that are 
important for any impact evaluation of employment 
programs, both in the design and analysis stages, regard-
less of the specific evaluation techniques used. It then 
describes the main evaluation techniques, including the 
data requirements and the main assumptions invoked 
by each.
2. The evaluation of employment 
programs
An impact evaluation of a labor market program 
is a quantitative analysis that specifies one or more 
outcome variables of interest (for example earnings, 
employment) and that estimates the difference a pro-
gram makes to the levels of these outcome variables. 
Figure 1 depicts this graphically. So an impact evalua-
tion of Get-to-Work, for instance, might estimate the 
average earnings of participants, and the average earn-
ings that participants would have earned had they not 
participated in the program. The difference between the 
two estimates of average earnings would be the impact 
of Get-to-Work on earnings.
2.1. The Counterfactual
Assume that participants in the Get-to-Work pro-
gram earn an average of $200 per week six months after 
the program starts. One might be tempted to think 
that this is the impact of Get-to-Work on earnings six 
months after the start of the program. However, some 
Figure 1: The Evaluation Problem
Note: The impact of a program is the dierence in the outcome variable for participants and what 
participants would have obtained if they had not participated.
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participants could have found a job and earned money 
even if they had not participated in Get-to-Work. Let’s 
say that the average earnings of participants had they 
not participated in Get-to-Work is $130. In this case, the 
average impact of Get-to-Work is $70, which represents 
the difference the program makes to the average earn-
ings of participants.
We note that estimating the average earnings of 
participants ($200 in the above example) is relatively 
straightforward. It involves using observed data to com-
pute the average earnings of participants. However, 
estimating the average earnings of participants if they 
had not participated (usually called the counterfactual, 
and equal to $130 in the above example) is considerably 
more complicated, as it is not observed. To get around 
this, one uses data on the earnings of non-participants. 
However, in general one cannot expect the average earn-
ings of non-participants to be the same as what partici-
pants would have earned had they not participated. This 
is because participants and non-participants are usually 
different in terms of their background characteristics. So 
the difference in earnings between participants and non-
participants not only reflects the impact of the program 
(the objective), but also differences that are unrelated to 
the program (i.e. differences in background characteris-
tics that yield a bias).
2.2. Sources of Bias
One important type of bias is what is known as 
selection bias. This may occur when, in comparing the 
outcomes of participants and non-participants, the ana-
lyst fails to observe some particular background differ-
ences between the two groups that affect their outcomes. 
In our example, imagine that the participants and non-
participants of Get-to-Work are identical in most charac-
teristics except motivation, with non-participants being 
less motivated than participants. For this reason, let’s 
assume that the earnings of non-participants are $20 
lower than the earnings participants would have had in 
the absence of the program, so $110 (= $130-$20). What 
will be observed in the administrative or survey data are 
the average earnings of participants ($200) and the aver-
age earnings of non-participants ($110). The true coun-
terfactual of $130 is not observed. So by simply subtract-
ing the average earnings of non-participants from those 
of participants, one obtains a program impact of $90 
(=$200-$110). This comprises the true impact of the 
Get-to-Work program ($70) and the impact of differ-
ences in motivation ($20). The latter is a bias. In reality, 
it is not possible to separate out the true impact and the 
bias using data in this way.
A different type of bias emerges when the impact 
is estimated by comparing the outcomes of partici-
pants only, before and after the program. In order to 
understand this source of bias, imagine that the Get-
to-Work participants earned $190 on average before 
starting training and, as above, earned $200 after fin-
ishing training, say a year later. The estimated impact 
of $10 obtained by comparing earnings before and 
after participation in Get-to-Work underestimates the 
true impact of the program of $70. The bias is due to 
the fact that earnings can vary from year to year for 
many reasons, such as prevailing economic conditions, 
so one cannot attribute any differences between the 
two years to the program only. Note again that with 
actual data one would not be able to pinpoint this bias 
because the true impact is unknown—it is what we are 
trying to estimate!
There are different evaluation techniques that can 
be applied to data in order to estimate the counterfac-
tual and thus the impact of a program. Before entering 
into a discussion of the different techniques, a summary 
of the issues that are common across most evaluation 
techniques is provided.
3. Issues common to most evaluation 
techniques
3.1. Individual- and cluster-level evaluations
Two basic schemes can be used to evaluate a pro-
gram: an individual-level or a cluster-level evaluation. 
There is no hard and fast rule as to which approach is 
more appropriate. It depends on such issues as political 
considerations, the nature of the question being asked, 
the extent of externalities, and logistical concerns. The 
individual-level approach consists of using data from 
participants and non-participants living in the same 
communities. So within each community, one must 
observe both participants and non-participants.
In a cluster-level analysis of labor market programs 
in developing countries, a cluster is generally a geo-
graphical concept, such as a village or community. This 
type of analysis requires one to distinguish between 
treatment communities (communities where the pro-
gram is in place by the time of the evaluation) and 
control communities (communities where the program 
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is not in place by the time of the evaluation). This dis-
tinction comes naturally in a pilot phase of a program, 
before it is rolled out nationally. A sample of individuals 
that verifies eligibility requirements is drawn from both 
types of communities. It is very important that the sam-
ple is collected in the same way in both types of commu-
nity (that is, that the same sampling scheme is followed). 
This means that the sample is not based on whether an 
individual participates or not in the program, as we only 
know this in treatment communities and not in control 
ones. Note that the results of a cluster-level evaluation 
refer to the group of eligible individuals and not to 
the group of participants. This is because one cannot 
know who the participants would have been in control 
communities. Consequently, if not many participants 
take up the program, there will be little change in the 
outcomes of the set of eligible individuals living in treat-
ment communities, and the estimated impact will be 
small. This is intuitive: if a program attracts few people, 
the difference that the program makes—its impact—is 
likely to be small.1
A cluster-level evaluation is generally more expen-
sive than an individual-level one because it requires 
a larger sample and the collection of data from a sig-
nificant number of communities.2 However, there are at 
least two important instances when it is more appropri-
ate than an individual-level evaluation.
The first is the existence of spillovers from par-
ticipants to non-participants. Let’s take a couple of 
examples of how these might occur and their implica-
tions: (1) Assume that the evaluation of Get-to-Work is 
carried out at the individual level by comparing earnings 
of participants and non-participants living in the same 
communities. Participants are likely to chat to non-
participants and it is not inconceivable that they convey 
to them some of what they have learned in the training 
sessions. If this transfer of information, or spillovers, is 
very strong, it is plausible that there might be no differ-
ence in the skills of participants and non-participants, 
and that the earnings of both groups increase by the 
same amount as a result of Get-to-Work. This would 
lead one to the erroneous conclusion that the program 
has no impact on earnings. (2) Spillovers might also 
occur through the labour market. In small labour mar-
kets, non-participants may be harmed by the fact that a 
group of individuals is participating in Get-to-Work. For 
example, employers might now prefer to employ indi-
viduals who participate in Get-to-Work and as a result 
the demand for and earnings of non-participants might 
drop. Let’s say they drop by $20. In our example, this 
means that the earnings of non-participants are $110 
rather than $130, and yields an estimate of the impact of 
the program of $90 (= $200-$110) rather than $70 for 
participants and –$20 for non-participants.
The second instance where a cluster-level evalu-
ation might be preferred to an individual-level one is 
when it is not politically feasible to exclude some eligible 
individuals in the community from participating in a 
program. In other words, it might not be feasible to have 
participants and non-participants living in the same 
community. In general, one would choose a cluster-level 
evaluation for programs that are to be implemented in 
small communities and where take-up of the program is 
expected to be reasonably high.
3.2. Treatment and Intention to Treat
There are two types of impacts that an evaluation 
can estimate: the impact of the treatment itself, and 
the impact of being offered the treatment (regardless 
of whether it was received or not). The latter is called 
the intention to treat impact. These two impacts are 
different because not everyone who is offered it ends 
up participating in the program. It might depend on 
the way the program is marketed, targeted and deliv-
ered. The impact of Get-to-Work could be reasonably 
high, but the intention to treat might be low if take up 
of the program is low. Clearly, these effects are impor-
tant for policy and this is why the intention to treat 
impact might be interesting in many settings. In some 
circumstances, upon being offered to participate in 
Get-to-Work, the individual might decline to participate 
but the offer itself might motivate him/her to look for 
alternative training possibilities. In such an instance, 
Get-to-Work has a positive intention to treat impact on 
the individual even if the individual does not partici-
pate in Get-to-Work.
1  The lower the take-up rate, the larger the sample required to 
estimate the impact. To understand why, assume that only 5% of 
the eligible individuals participate in Get-to-Work. This means that 
the impact of the program amongst eligible individuals would be 
$3.50 (=0.05 x $70). As this is a small number, one would need 
a large sample to obtain an estimate that is statistically different 
from zero.
2  The larger sample required is not only related to the possibility 
of low take-up of the program, but also to the existence of vari-
ables that vary at the community level and that affect the relevant 
outcomes.
A P rac t i c ione r ’s  Gu ide  to  Eva lua t ing  the  Impac t s  of  Labo r  Ma rke t  P rog rams
4
3.3. General data requirements
Unfortunately there is no simple data checklist 
that applies to all evaluation techniques, though most 
techniques have some overlap. First, data are required 
on the outcomes of interest. And second, data on 
background characteristics, or ‘covariates’, are generally 
necessary. These two data requirements are discussed 
in more detail below. Any other technique-specific 
data requirements are outlined in the relevant parts of 
section 4.
3.3.1. Outcome variables
It is useful to consider two types of variables: out-
comes and covariates. Outcome variables are the ones 
that policymakers have in mind as the ultimate goals of 
the program, i.e. the actual impacts/benefits/changes for 
participants during or after the program. In most evalu-
ations of labour market programs, the final outcome 
variables include earnings and employment. They could 
also include some variables that measure job quality, 
such as whether the employment contract is written and 
formal, and whether it includes social security. It is also 
very important to track intermediate outcomes, which 
can be thought of as variables that could be directly 
affected by the program and that are a first step towards 
achieving the final outcomes. They are sometimes called 
mechanisms/channels. In the context of Get-to-Work, 
these intermediate outcomes might include skills, con-
tacts in the labour market, and motivation to search 
for a job, for instance. Understanding the impact of the 
program on these intermediate outcomes might be use-
ful in order to understand how the program is making 
a difference (channels or pathways), and might help one 
to improve the program or to understand how feasible 
it is to extrapolate it to other settings.
3.3.2. Covariates
As mentioned in section 2, differences in back-
ground characteristics between participants and non-
participants might yield biased estimates of the impact 
of the program. Covariates, often referred to as observed 
background characteristics or control variables, can 
affect directly the outcome variable of interest, and can 
also affect the relationship between the program and 
the outcome. So they are controlled for in the analysis 
in order to strip out their effects from the estimated 
impact. In contrast, unobserved background character-
istics are variables that are not included in the analysis, 
usually because the information is not available (either 
because it is difficult or costly to measure).
One important requirement is that the covariates 
used in the analysis are not affected by the program, or 
if one suspects that they are, that pre-program values 
of the covariates are used instead. Otherwise one might 
underestimate the effect of the program. To take an 
example, one might be tempted to use house conditions 
(e.g. construction materials of the house) measured 
during or after a program in order to purge the impact 
estimates of the effect of background characteristics 
(here, house conditions, which may be a proxy for 
wealth). However, the potential problem with this is 
that participants may improve house conditions with 
the extra earnings that they obtain due to the program. 
In this case, using dwelling conditions during or after 
the program may underestimate the impact of the pro-
gram. However, there is no problem in using measures 
of dwelling conditions from before the program starts, 
as the program could not have affected them. In fact, 
one of the most important reasons for carrying out a 
baseline (or pre-program) survey is to collect a large 
set of variables that could not have been affected by the 
program and that can be used as covariates in the impact 
evaluation. In the absence of a baseline survey, the set of 
potential covariates will be much smaller as it is feasible 
that many variables may have been affected by participa-
tion in the program.3
Covariates can also be put to other uses including 
(1) to estimate whether the impact varies for differ-
ent groups of the population (as grouped according 
to values of particular observed characteristics), (2) to 
obtain a measure of how different participants and non-
participants are in observed background characteristics, 
(3) to corroborate hypotheses on the nature of sample 
selection (for instance, if one believed that participants 
were more motivated than non-participants, this belief 
would be backed up by observing that participants had 
attended more training courses than non-participants 
before the start of Get-to-Work).
It is very important that information on outcomes 
and covariates is obtained from the same sources and 
3  In the absence of a baseline, one could ask retrospective infor-
mation on housing conditions before the start of the program. 
However, in practice, the collection of retrospective data might be 
affected by a recall bias. Pre-program administrative records, where 
available, are often good sources of covariates.
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in a consistent manner for both participants and non-
participants. In relation to this point, one should never 
rely on program guidelines as a reliable source of data! 
For instance, even if the program is supposed to pro-
vide work to participants for 4 hours per day, in reality 
guidelines are unlikely to be followed to the letter. So it is 
important to collect information on hours worked, from 
participants as well as non-participants. Another reason 
that the same questionnaire should always be applied to 
all, regardless of participation status, is that it avoids so 
called “framing effects”.4
4. Techniques for impact evaluation
In this section, the different techniques to estimate 
the counterfactual, and hence the impact of a program 
such as Get-to-Work, are described. It starts with the 
experimental technique of randomization, often consid-
ered to be the gold-standard of evaluation techniques. 
This is because participants and non-participants are 
chosen at random, so any differences in their outcomes 
can be attributed to the program. It then describes 
quasi-experimental techniques in which the allocation 
of the program between participants and non-partici-
pants is not random but is decided by the individuals 
themselves together with politicians, policymakers and/
or the institutions running the program. It is important 
to understand the objectives and logistical constraints 
of those who are involved in allocating the program 
between participants and non-participants because this 
can often help the analyst to assess in what particular 
dimensions participants and non-participants are likely 
to be different. Quasi-experimental techniques, which 
include matching, difference-in-differences, instru-
mental variables and regression discontinuity, are used 
to overcome the problem that participants and non-
participants may be different for reasons other than 
program participation, and so differences in their out-
comes cannot be attributed solely to the program.
4.1. Randomization and its variants
This technique, in its pure form, allocates partici-
pants and non-participants randomly. One could think 
of it as tossing a coin to decide who the participants 
and non-participants are. The main advantage of ran-
domization is that, because (if carried out properly and 
assuming the sample is large enough) the only differ-
ence between participants and non-participants is the 
toss of a coin, there are no differences in background 
characteristics between them. In this case, a simple 
difference in means between participants and non-
participants estimates the impact of a program on the 
outcomes.5
However, sometimes political considerations get in 
the way of randomizing: no government wants to become 
unpopular by excluding eligible unemployed individuals 
from a training program (even though the program 
has not yet been evaluated so it is not known whether 
it works!). A more politically palatable approach is to 
withhold the program from controls for a set period and 
then extend it to them. This at least allows for an evalu-
ation of short-term effects. That aside, when operation-
ally feasible, randomization is the preferred technique 
for impact evaluation because it estimates the causal 
impact of a program under weak and very plausible 
assumptions. However, when carrying out the random-
ization, it is important to choose program participants 
who are representative of the population that would be 
targeted were the program to be rolled out on a large 
scale. For instance, it is better to randomize among the 
group of individuals who have expressed an interest in 
participating in the program, than to randomize among 
individuals listed in an unemployment register, who 
may have very different characteristics from the popula-
tion that would be targeted by the program were it rolled 
out after the evaluation.
When access to the program is universal, a group of 
individuals cannot be excluded from participating in the 
program in order to serve as a control group. Moreover, 
as alluded to already, governments may not want to risk 
popularity by excluding eligible people from the pro-
gram. In such circumstances, an encouragement design 
would allow one to still carry out a credible evaluation. 
4  Framing refers to the manner in which questions are posed. 
Naturally, there will be instances where some questions may not be 
applicable to non-participants. For example, if the program involves 
making payments to participants then any questions relating to 
these payments will not apply to non-participants.
5  When the evaluation is carried out at the cluster level, it is entire 
clusters (for instance, communities) that are randomized in and 
out. In this case, if there are few clusters, one could end up with 
differences in background characteristics between clusters. One way 
to reduce the risk of this happening is to first form pairs of clusters, 
with each pair consisting of the two clusters most similar to each 
other in terms of observed characteristics. Then the treatment could 
be allocated randomly within pairs (so within each pair, one cluster 
would receive the treatment and the other would not).
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and whether (s)he was randomized in or randomized 
out, is important. Finally, the collection of a baseline 
survey is not strictly necessary but is advisable particu-
larly in cases where the program is randomized among 
a small group of clusters, as differences in background 
characteristics can still occur by chance and data from 
a baseline survey can help to correct for them using the 
methods that will be explained in section 4.3.
4.2. Matching
Matching estimates the counterfactual using data 
on non-participants, but giving more weight to non-
participants who are more similar to participants, as 
measured by observable background characteristics (See 
Box 2).10 Two steps are required to estimate the impact 
of Get-to-Work using matching. In the first step, the 
analyst discards participants for whom there is no simi-
lar non-participant. This has the implication that the 
impact estimates will only be representative of individu-
als who have not been discarded. In the second step, a 
weighted average of the earnings of non-participants is 
computed. As discussed, this average (which is the esti-
mate of the counterfactual) is weighted in such a way 
that non-participants who are relatively more similar 
to participants receive a larger weight than those who 
are relatively less similar to participants. The impact is 
obtained from the difference between the average earn-
ings of participants who were not discarded in the first 
The encouragement design consists of selecting a group 
of individuals and then randomizing an incentive to 
participate, or providing extra information about the 
program to this group, so that the subgroup that ends 
up with the incentive has a higher probability of par-
ticipation.6,7 For instance, in the context of Get-to-Work, 
a social worker could visit the homes of a randomly 
selected group of people on various occasions, inform 
them of the availability of Get-to-Work, provide them 
with information about the program, and ultimately 
encourage them to participate in it. One would expect 
the group of people that received the visit to be more 
likely to participate than the group of people that did 
not receive it.
Another variant is to randomize the treatment allo-
cation within a group of applicants, and to allow indi-
viduals who are randomized out to participate only if 
they follow a time-consuming administrative procedure 
(see Box 1). Another variant is to allow drop outs to 
be replaced by individuals who were randomized out.8 
Both of these variants require larger sample sizes than 
pure randomization.
Strictly speaking, the randomization method only 
requires the collection of data on outcomes, as covari-
ates are “in theory” not required to net out differences 
in background characteristics (there should be none!). 
However, it is advisable to collect information on covari-
ates, not only to show that individuals or clusters that 
were randomized in and out do indeed have the same 
background characteristics, but also to allow the ana-
lyst to estimate the impact for different demographic 
groups (heterogeneous effects).9 The use of covariates 
can also improve the precision of the estimates. In terms 
of other data that should be collected, information for 
each individual on whether (s)he is a participant or not 
BOX 1: An example of Randomization
Training Disadvantaged Youth in Latin America: Evidence from a Ran-
domized Trial, by Attanasio O, Kugler A, and Meghir C. 2008
What: Evaluate the impact of a training program for young people. The program com-
bines in-class training with an internship in a firm
Where: Colombia
How: The program is oversubscribed. A random process divides applicants into partici-
pants and non-participants. The latter are allowed to participate only if they follow a time-
consuming administrative procedure
Findings: The program raises earnings and employment for both males and females. 
The effects are larger for females
6  When these variants are used, estimates are obtained through 
instrumental variables techniques. The instrumental variable in this 
instance is whether or not the individual was (randomly) encour-
aged to participate (see section 4.4. for a description).
7  Unlike pure randomization, this design will not identify a rep-
resentative effect of the population of participants. Rather, it 
will estimate the effect of the program for those individuals who 
participate with the incentive but who would not have participated 
without it. This might be a problem if one believes the impact to 
be very heterogeneous.
8  Card et al. (2007) use this variant to evaluate a training program 
for youth in the Dominican Republic
9  Moreover, if the data is rich in content it might be used to answer 
other interesting questions apart from the impact of the program. 
This is important because data collection usually has a high fixed 
cost.
10  Matching is used by, for example, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) 
to estimate the impact of a workfare program in Argentina, and 
by Rodríguez-Planas and Jacob (2009) to estimate the impact of 
four types of active labor market policies in Romania (Training and 
Retraining, Self-Employment Assistance, Public Employment, and 
Public Employment and Relocation Services).
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step, and the estimate of the counterfactual obtained in 
the second step. There are many matching techniques 
and they differ in both the way they define similarity 
and the way the weights are computed. Common to 
all of the techniques is that similarity is defined using 
the values of the covariates. In general, the similarity 
between two individuals is measured by the differences 
in the values that their covariates take.
The crucial assumption in matching is that the set 
of covariates that the analyst uses, that is, the observed 
background characteristics, includes all of the variables 
that simultaneously affect both outcomes and program 
participation.11 For instance, if participants in Get-
to-Work are more motivated than non-participants, 
and it is true that more motivated individuals have 
higher earnings, then matching will not remove the 
selection bias described in section 2.2. This is why 
matching methods generally call for including a large 
set of covariates, and hence a baseline survey is highly 
desirable (see section 3.3).12 Labor market histories 
are good candidates to include in the set of covariates 
because it is widely believed that they are a good proxy 
for variables that are important determinants of labor 
market outcomes but that are difficult to measure (such 
as motivation).
4.3. Difference-in-differences
Difference-in-differences is a technique that rec-
ognizes that participants and non-participants would 
have different average outcomes even in the absence of 
the program (see Box 3). In the Get-to-Work example, 
participants earn $20 more than non-participants even 
in the absence of the program due to their higher 
motivation.13 The underlying assumption behind the 
technique is that differences in outcomes due to differ-
ences in unobserved background characteristics ($20) 
do not change over time. Consequently, one can account 
for them as follows. Differences unrelated to program 
participation (i.e. motivation) are estimated by going 
back in time and measuring the outcome variables 
of non-participants and would-be- participants, before 
the program started. As already discussed, Get-to-Work 
participants earned $190 in the year before the pro-
gram started. As differences in motivation between them 
and non-participants remain constant over time, non-
participants must have earned $170 (i.e. $20 less than 
participants) in the same period. The difference between 
these two pre-program earnings measures, $20 (= $190 
– $170) is the so-called pre-existing difference. For ease of 
exposition, let’s define the contemporaneous difference as 
the difference in the outcome variable between partici-
pants and non-participants at the time that the impact 
is estimated (while the program is active or when it has 
BOX 3: An example of Difference-in-
differences
Training Jump-Starting Self-Employment? Evidence among Welfare 
Participants in Argentina, by Almeida, R and Galasso E.
 2007
What: Evaluate the impact of a program that promotes self-employment by providing 
technical assistance as well as grants for inputs and equipment
Where: Argentina
How: Use data for both participants and non-participants, both before and after the 
program. An important factor that explains non-participation is that some municipalities 
delayed their participation in the program
Findings: The program increases on average participants’ total number of hours worked 
by just under 15
BOX 2: An example of Matching
Estimating the benefit incidence of an antipoverty program by propen-
sity score matching, by Jalan, J and Ravallion M. 2003
What: Evaluate the impact of a workfare program in which participants work at relatively 
low wages in socially useful projects located in poor areas
Where: Argentina
How: A sample of participants, and a national sample that contains information on non-
participants, are used. Similarity between participants and non-participants is measured by 
their estimated probability to participate (propensity score)
Findings: The program increases on average the earnings of participants by about half 
of the gross wage
11  Any unobserved background characteristic must not affect either 
the probability of participation in the program or the outcome vari-
able (or both).
12  However, one must note that this is at some cost. The more 
covariates that are included in the model, the more likely it is that 
there are participants for whom one cannot find a counterpart in 
the set of non-participants. This in turn restricts the set of individu-
als for whom the estimate of the program impact is representative.
13  This could be either because there are differences in the socio-
demographic composition of the group of participants versus 
non-participants, or differences in the effect that these variables 
have on outcomes. For instance, both of the following should have 
remained constant over time: (1) the difference between partici-
pants and non-participants in the percentage of individuals with 
secondary education , and (2) the difference between participants 
and non-participants in the returns to education.
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finished). As explained in section 2, in general, the con-
temporaneous difference $90 (= $200 – $110) includes 
both the impact of the program and any other differenc-
es that are unrelated to program participation (i.e. moti-
vation). If one assumes that the latter has not changed 
over time, one can subtract the estimate of pre-existing 
difference ($20) from the contemporaneous difference 
($90) to obtain an estimate of the impact of the program 
($70). This method of subtracting the pre-existing dif-
ference removes the bias as long as the assumption that 
the differences unrelated to program participation have 
remained constant over time holds. The basic method of 
difference-in-differences can be strengthened by using 
covariates in a regression or matching framework.14
In order to compute the pre-existing difference, 
the analyst needs to know who the participants and 
non-participants are at baseline, before the program 
has started. If panel data are going to be collected, 
one can wait until the follow-up survey (i.e. during 
or after the program) to collect this information. 
However, it should be noted that the difference-in-
difference method does not always require the same 
individual to be followed over time (panel data). In 
some circumstances, one can perform the analysis 
using two repeated cross sections as long as one can 
identify at baseline who will go on to be participants 
and non-participants. For instance, sometimes par-
ticipants are individuals in a particular age group liv-
ing in certain communities, and non-participants are 
individuals in the same age group living in a different 
set of communities. In other instances, participation 
and non-participation status depends on membership 
of certain organizations. In these examples, one readily 
knows who the participants are, even at baseline before 
the program has started.15 This is particularly useful 
when the analysis is being carried out using household 
surveys that are not exclusively collected for the evalu-
ation of a given program.
A common problem in the evaluation of labor 
market programs using difference-in-differences is the 
so-called Ashenfelter dip (Ashenfelter, 1978). This occurs 
when non-participants are drawn from the pool of 
individuals that does not apply to the program, and 
participants apply to the program because they have 
experienced a temporary drop in earnings. When this 
is the case, one risks over-estimating the pre-existing 
difference, which in turn biases the impact estimate. 
For this reason, it is advisable to draw the pool of non-
participants from the pool of applicants. In this way, the 
pre-program drop in earnings will be similar across both 
groups and thus the pre-existing difference between 
their earnings will not be overestimated. It is also advis-
able to collect retrospective income and labour supply 
data, say from the previous year, so that the pre-existing 
difference is estimated using data that is relatively dis-
tant from the time of application to the program (and 
thus less likely to be affected by the impending pro-
gram). Instrumental variables, discussed next, can also 
be used to solve the Ashenfelter dip (see Almeida and 
Galasso, 2007).
4.4. Instrumental Variables
Instrumental Variables is a technique that recognizes 
that participants and non-participants would have differ-
ent average outcomes even in the absence of the program, 
most likely because they differ in background characteris-
tics (see Box 4). Its underlying assumption is that there is 
at least one variable, called an instrumental variable, that 
(1) predicts program participation, (2) only affects out-
comes through affecting program participation, and (3) 
is not correlated with the unobserved background char-
acteristics that affect outcomes. The two last conditions 
cannot be tested and must be assessed on a case by case 
basis.16 The methods that will be outlined in the post-
script would be useful to analyze their plausibility. It must 
be emphasized that the evaluation will only be as good 
as the instrumental variable is in the sense of verifying 
the conditions above. A rich set of covariates will make 
it more likely that the last two conditions can be met.17
Though the instrumental variable can be continu-
ous, the logic of the instrumental variable technique 
can be more easily understood by considering a binary 
instrument. In the context of Get-to-Work, assume that 
14  Almeida and Galasso (2007) use difference-in-differences within 
a regression framework to evaluate a program that promotes self-
employment in Argentina, and Díaz and Jaramillo (2006) use 
difference-in-differences within a matching framework to evaluate 
a training program for youth in Peru.
15  When this approach is used, one should check that the com-
position of participants and non-participants in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics has not changed over time.
16  Note that if the instrumental variable is correlated with many 
observed variables, it will be difficult to argue that it is not cor-
related with any unobserved variable.
17  Bartik (2002) uses this technique to estimate the effect of state 
level welfare caseload on wages and unemployment rates of low 
skilled individuals.
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there are two type of communities, ones where the 
program registration office is very centrally located, 
and others where individuals must travel very far to 
register and thus to participate. One would naturally 
expect program participation to be higher in commu-
nities where it the office is centrally located (condition 
1 above). Assume further that travelling long distances 
for a training program does not affect the determi-
nants of labor market outcomes apart from the effect it 
might have on participation in the program (condition 
2), and that the unobserved characteristics of the labor 
markets and of the individuals living in communi-
ties where the office is centrally located are identical 
to those in communities where it is not. Under such 
circumstances, one can build the Wald estimator which 
is the simplest version of an instrumental variable 
estimator.18
4.5. Regression Discontinuity
Sometimes, eligibility to participate in a program 
is determined on the basis of the value of an index. For 
instance, each individual in our Get-to-Work example 
could have an index which would take the value 0 for 
the poorest individual and 100 for the richest. The index 
level of most individuals would lie somewhere between 
0 and 100, depending on their poverty level. Individuals 
would be eligible to participate in Get-to-Work if their 
index level is below a particular threshold, such as is 
determined by the program administrator. This implies 
that there is a large fall (or discontinuity) in the partici-
pation rate from households with a value slightly below 
the threshold, to households with a value slightly above 
the threshold.19
The logic of regression discontinuity is as follows. If 
there is a fall in the percentage of participating house-
holds in Get-to-Work at the threshold, and the program 
has an effect on labor market outcomes, then there 
should also be an abrupt change in labor market out-
comes at the threshold. To implement this technique, 
one requires data on the outcomes of interest, the value 
of the index, the participation threshold, and whether or 
not the individual (or whatever the unit of observation) 
has participated in the program. In order to have suffi-
cient power, large enough samples around the threshold 
are required (see Box 5).
One advantage of this technique is that policy mak-
ers usually find it easy to justify because it favours those 
that need the program the most. However, some caveats 
are in order. First, the impact estimate is only informa-
tive for households with a value of the index around the 
threshold. Thus it is difficult to extrapolate findings to the 
general population. On this note, it requires big enough 
samples around the cut-off point to have sufficient power. 
Second, it is important that no other program induces 
a fall in participation at the threshold. Otherwise, one 
would inadvertently be considering the effect of all such 
programs. Finally, one should be wary of households or 
BOX 4: An example of Instrumental 
Variables
Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Labor Market Spillover Effects of 
Welfare Reform, by Bartik, T 2002
What: Evaluate the impact of state level welfare caseload on wages and unemployment 
rates of low skilled individuals
Where: United States
How: Estimate instrumental variable regressions of wages and unemployment rate on 
welfare caseload, using labor market and political variables as instruments
Findings: Find some evidence of reduced employment and wages
18  Intuitively, the Wald estimator takes the effect of the instrument 
on the outcome and divides it by the effect of the instrument on 
participation. In the example here, the numerator is the average 
earnings of eligible individuals living in communities in which the 
Get-to-Work office is centrally located, minus the average earnings 
of eligible individuals living in communities in which it is not. The 
denominator is the difference between the percentage of partici-
pants in communities where it is free and communities where it 
is not.
19  Klinger and Schündeln (2007) use this technique to estimate 
the impact of a entrepreneurial training program on enterprise 
outcomes.
BOX 5: An example of Regression 
Discontinuity
Can Entrepreneurial Activity be Taught? Quasi-Experimental Evidence 
from Central America, by Klinger, B and Schündeln M. 2007
What: Evaluate the impact of a program that provides entrepreneurship training
Where: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua
How: Each applicant to the training program is given a score based on his/her entrepre-
neurial ability. Individuals with scores above a threshold participate in the training. The 
impact is estimated through the abrupt change in outcomes that occurs at the threshold
Findings: Participating in the training program significantly increases the probability of 
starting a new business or expanding an existing one
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authorities misreporting the components of the means 
test in order to score lower and become eligible to par-
ticipate. If such manipulation is present, which is usu-
ally manifest in a significant number of households with 
a score just below the threshold, then one should use 
household surveys that have not been collected for the 
specific purpose of determining eligibility.
Postscript: A tip for assessing the validity 
of the evaluation strategy
The analyst, facing a menu of evaluation techniques, 
is likely to meet with scepticism or even criticism at 
some point regarding the evaluation method chosen. 
Assumptions can always be questioned and challenged. 
It is important to include plenty of descriptive statis-
tics in the analysis, to examine carefully pre-program 
as well as post-program data, and to look for support 
for assumptions invoked by the particular evaluation 
method used. But another way to assess the credibility 
of results is to repeat the exact same evaluation method, 
but using as an outcome variable one that should not be 
affected by the program! A particularly neat procedure 
is to take an outcome variable considered in the evalua-
tion but relating instead to a period before the program 
started (i.e. the lagged value of the outcome).20 If the 
evaluation strategy is indeed reasonable, one should find 
that the program has no effect on the lagged outcome 
variable, as the program was not in operation then. If 
one finds that it does have an effect, it suggests strongly 
that one of the main assumptions invoked by the tech-
nique is being violated. This approach calls for collecting 
retrospective information on outcome variables.
5. Conclusion
Readers of this note are no doubt well aware of 
the vast array of potential labor market programs and 
policies, not least of all in developing countries. But 
there is a need to know which programs work best, so 
that scarce resources can be allocated optimally. This 
note has been motivated by the importance of credible 
impact evaluations of labour market programs for guid-
ing international organizations, policymakers, donors, 
and other potential stakeholders, as to which programs 
and policies work best.
Program design is of the utmost importance, not 
just for effective implementation and delivery of pro-
grams, but also for impact evaluation: the program 
should be designed in such a way as to allow for its 
credible evaluation. A pilot stage is important in order 
to test whether the program works and to quantify its 
effects. This is also an opportunity to try out different 
variants of a program in order to compare them and see 
which works best. Randomization is widely considered 
to be the gold standard of evaluation. When done prop-
erly, it makes the construction of the counterfactual—
the situation without the program—very straightfor-
ward. But not all programs can be randomized, and this 
note has also discussed the main evaluation techniques 
used in instances when randomization is not possible. 
These evaluation techniques are extremely useful to 
know before the program is piloted, as they can influ-
ence strongly the types of data that need to be collected 
in order to evaluate the program properly, and the 
optimal way of designing the pilot. In essence, deciding 
which labor market programs to implement with lim-
ited resources can only be done with careful planning 
and rigorous evaluation.
20 For the difference-in-differences technique, one would need this 
outcome to be measured two periods before the program started.
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